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Getting More Organs for Transplantation
Abstract
Organs for transplantation are a scarce resource. Paying to increase the supply of organs is illegal in
much of the world. We review efforts to increase transplantation by increasing the supply of available
organs from living and deceased donors. Progress has been made in increasing the availability of living
donor kidneys through kidney exchange. Recent legislation in Israel aims at encouraging deceased
donation by awarding priority for receiving organs to registered donors. We also explore the manner in
which organ donation is solicited and present evidence to suggest that some recent movement towards
"mandated choice" may be counterproductive.
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Getting More Organs for Transplantation †
By Judd B. Kessler and Alvin E. Roth*
The United States and most other nations suffer from a shortage of human organs for transplant. In the United States, over 120,000 people
are on waiting lists for organ transplant and
every year over 10,000 people die while waiting (Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network). There are a number of fronts on
which research has made progress to address
this shortage, but there is still significant work to
be done. We describe how organs are acquired
and allocated, strategies that have been implemented to increase the number or organ donations for transplantation from living donors, and
work we are conducting to understand how we
can recover more organs from deceased donors.
For example, how organs are allocated can moderate their scarcity, not just through efficiencies
in allocation but also through changes in donor
behavior. We will describe a market design being
explored in Israel to increase organ donor registration by providing priority on organ waiting
lists for individuals who previously registered
as organ donors. We will also report results that
raise concern over policies that have recently
been implemented in the United Kingdom and
several US states, namely changing the way the
organ registration question is asked to a “mandated choice” frame.
Organs for transplant can be recovered from
living donors and deceased donors. Living
donors give an organ while alive. Living donation of kidneys, which represented 96 percent of all US living organ donations in 2012
(OPTN), is possible since humans have two kidneys but can live a healthy life with only one,
allowing the other to be removed and donated.

The vast majority of these living donors make
directed donations: they donate the organ to a
prespecified recipient, usually a family member. There are relatively rare instances of nondirected donation, where an individual donates to
whoever needs an organ; just over 3 percent of
living donor kidneys in the United States came
from nondirected donors in 2012 (Cook and
Krawiec 2013).
Deceased donors are individuals whose organs
are donated at the time of their death. The majority of organ donors are deceased donors (58 percent in 2012 when there were 8,143 deceased
donors and 5,867 living donors, per OPTN). In
addition, since each deceased donor can donate
multiple organs, the large majority of organs are
recovered from deceased donors (81 percent of
all organs for transplant in 2012, per OPTN).
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act requires consent for deceased donation, either by the individual having previously registered as an organ
donor or by the deceased’s next of kin. Organ
donor registration usually takes place at state
departments of motor vehicles, and despite the
relative ease of becoming an organ donor—usually just checking a box or signing a form—only
43 percent of Americans are registered (Donate
Life America 2012). Many additional organs
are recovered when next of kin consent to donation on behalf of unregistered deceased. (Next
of kin are also asked to consent to donation of
registered donors. While this confirmation is not
deemed to be legally necessary to proceed with
donation, it is usually done anyway; see Glazier
2011). That next of kin play an important role
means that registration and transplantation are
not identical, which is going to be important
when we discuss priorities for registration and
mandated choice.
Organs that are made available for transplant
save lives and lower medical costs. For organs
like the liver and the heart, patients who do not
receive an organ for transplant when they need
one often have short life expectancy. Individuals
with kidney failure can survive for a number of
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years on dialysis, but they live ten years longer on average if they receive an organ from a
deceased donor (Wolfe et al. 1999). Receiving
a living donor kidney likely generates additional
life years since the average living donor kidney
lasts substantially longer than a deceased donor
kidney. In addition, dialysis costs Medicare
about $90,000 a year, while transplantation costs
$100,000 for the surgery plus $20,000 a year for
immunosuppressive drugs (i.e., an out of pocket
savings of $250,000 per transplant over the first
five years; see Rees et al. 2012).
With such significant gains coming from
organ donation and transplantation, the excess
demand for organs is an important policy problem. One standard first response by economists
is that we can solve excess demand by raising
the price from the current legal limit of zero by
allowing organs to be bought and sold, potentially for both living and deceased donation (see,
e.g., Becker and Elias 2007). However this is not
easy to implement, since many countries have
strict legislation against such transactions (in the
United States it is a felony under the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984). Roth (2007)
uses the term “repugnant transaction” to denote
a transaction that some people would like to
engage in but which others think should not be
allowed and shows that repugnant transactions
have a long and varied history that changes in
time and place (e.g., charging interest on loans,
indentured servitude, selling horsemeat for
human consumption, and same-sex marriage all
have been repugnant transactions in some times
and places and not in others). Kidney sales are
often the leading example of a repugnant transaction cited by those who would put stricter limits
on markets in general (e.g., Sandel 2012, 2013),
because of their sense that such sales arouse
widespread opposition. A representative sample
survey of Americans conducted by Leider and
Roth (2010) suggests that disapproval of kidney
sales correlates with other socially conservative
attitudes, but that it does not rise to the level of
disapproval of other repugnant transactions such
as prostitution. In addition, there is evidence that
the manner of the payment to an organ donor
may mitigate some of the repugnance concerns.
Niederle and Roth (forthcoming) find that payments to nondirected kidney donors are deemed
more acceptable when they arise as a reward for
heroism and public service than when they are
viewed as a payment for kidneys.
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The particular interest in donations from
nondirected donors arises because of the large
effect they have on facilitating other live-donor
transplants, through the mechanism of kidney
exchange, which arose in the last decade as an
effective means of promoting transplantation
even when donors and their intended recipients are biologically incompatible (see Roth,
SÖnmez, and Ünver 2004, 2005 for early proposals that have led to large-scale implementation). As kidney exchange began to assemble
pools of patient-donor pairs, it became possible
to offer nondirected donors the possibility of initiating a long chain of donations, in which the
nondirected donor would donate to the patient
in an incompatible pair, whose donor would
donate to another pair, and so on (see, e.g., Roth
et al. 2006 for the suggestion that such chains
could be made long by being nonsimultaneous, and Rees et al. 2009 for the report of the
first nonsimultaneous chain, which at the time
of the report facilitated ten transplants, and subsequently grew to 16). In total there have been
over 2,500 paired donation kidney transplants
performed in the United States since the year
2000, when the first two transplants of that kind
were performed. Not only do long chains make
more efficient use of the otherwise unavailable
kidneys from willing donors who are incompatible with their intended recipients, it appears
that the possibility of initiating a long chain
and facilitating multiple transplants may inspire
additional nondirected donors.
While kidney exchange has increased the
number of living donor transplants, the waiting
list for transplants continues to grow, highlighting the need to explore other avenues—such as,
strategies to increase the number of deceased
donor organs available for transplant. As for
living organ donation, legislation in the United
States and most other nations prohibits the use
of monetary payments as an inducement for
deceased organ donation. Consequently, one
promising approach has been to create nonmonetary incentives for deceased donation.
Singapore and, more recently, Israel have introduced allocation schemes that provide priority on organ donor waiting lists to individuals
who have previously registered as donors. Since
organ donor waiting lists can often be quite long
(e.g., the average wait time on the list for a kidney in the United States is over four years, per
OPTN) and receiving an organ for transplant
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sooner is usually preferable to the alternative
(e.g., remaining on dialysis), receiving priority
on a waiting list if an individual ever needs an
organ can be an actionable incentive to register.
Whether such policies are effective at generating new donors will require an analysis of
empirical data. Early indications of success are
promising (Lavee et al. 2013), but it will take
time for individuals to decide whether to register and to see whether the increase in registration leads to the desired increase in organs for
transplant (a gap between these may arise for
reasons we will address below). In the meantime, we can use laboratory experiments to better understand the priority architecture that has
been implemented in Israel and how it might be
implemented in other countries.
Our first project on priority allocation investigated whether such a rule would increase registration and the mechanisms that might generate
an effect (Kessler and Roth 2012). We designed
a laboratory game modeled on the decision to
register as an organ donor, in which subjects
could pay a monetary cost (meant to model the
psychic cost of registering as an organ donor)
that would allow their assets (meant to model
kidneys) to be donated to other subjects in the
lab who needed them to earn money once the
assets were no longer of use to the donor (meant
to model deceased donation). We compared
treatments where allocation of available assets
was made on a first-come, first-served basis
(meant to model the current US allocation system) to a treatment where those who agreed to
pay the cost to donate their assets received priority for any donated assets that became available.
The priority allocation rule led to a large, significant increase in donation. Additional treatments revealed that the main mechanism driving
this increase was the monetary incentive effect
of priority; the same increase in donation was
induced by providing a rebate for donation equal
to the expected value of having priority or by
lowering the cost of donation by the expected
value of having priority.
While our first experiment investigated the
reasons priority might work to increase organ
donations, it made a simplifying assumption that
we investigated in follow-up work. Namely, it
assumed that the allocation rule could be implemented so that everyone who registered as an
organ donor to receive priority would actually
donate when in a position to do so. However, the
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implementation of the priority rule in Israel suggests this assumption may not hold true. The
Israeli donor registration card, which one must
sign to receive priority, has a check box that
requires a clergyman chosen by the deceased’s
family to approve the donation at the time of
death. This check box has the potential to operate as a loophole in the priority allocation system whereby an individual signs a donor card to
receive priority on the waiting list if he is ever
in need of an organ but expects his family or
clergyman to decline the donation if he dies and
is in a position to donate. Essentially it allows
individuals to receive priority even though they
would never make a donation.
In a second laboratory study, we investigate
how such a loophole might affect the ability of
the priority system to increase donation as well
as registration (Kessler and Roth, forthcoming). First, we replicate the effect of the priority
rule we identified in our previous work (despite
changing the parameters of the laboratory
study in a number of ways). When registration
leads automatically to donation, we again find
that giving priority to individuals who register
increases the number of organs made available
for transplant. However, when we introduce a
loophole in the priority system—allowing subjects to register for priority but not pay the cost
of donation and so never donate—we find that
the loophole completely eliminates the benefit
of priority. Those subjects who might have been
induced to donate by the incentive of receiving priority simply take priority without paying
the cost of donation. Across all subjects in all
rounds, 96 percent have priority when the loophole is available.
We also find that introducing a loophole to a
priority allocation system might do additional
harm. In a set of treatments where we provide
subjects with information about the costs and
decisions of others (i.e., the distribution of
costs of donation and distributions of choices to
donate or to take the loophole in the previous
round) we get fewer donations under a priority
system with a loophole than under a first-come,
first-served system without priority. This means
that subjects who would have donated for altruistic or warm glow reasons (Andreoni 1990)
choose not to donate when a loophole is available. Investigating into the round-by-round data,
we find that this effect appears to be driven by
a conditional cooperation motive. Subjects are
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less likely to donate when they learn that others are choosing not to pay the cost of donation. However, subjects treat taking the loophole
as a worse affront than simply not donating,
presumably since those who take the loophole
are explicitly abusing a system designed to
reward donors. Consequently, subjects withhold
donation more in response to observing others
use the loophole than in response to observing others choose not to donate. Only time will
tell whether Israelis who do not want to donate
will take advantage of the clergy check box as
a loophole or how individuals might respond to
such an abuse. In the meantime, our results highlight that the way priority is implemented matters a great deal for the success of such market
designs.
While priority on organ donor waiting lists
for registered donors might be possible to implement in the United States, policy attention in
recent years has focused instead on how individuals are asked to register as organ donors. US
states and many other countries maintain an optin registry whereby individuals are by default
not organ donors but can choose to join the
registry. An alternative, implemented by many
European countries, presumes consent and
gives individuals the opportunity to opt out of
the organ donor registry. Johnson and Goldstein
(2003, 2004) show that European countries that
have opt-out systems have vastly higher donor
registration rates than the European countries
that have opt-in systems. The same authors find
that in hypothetical choice data subjects indicate they would be more likely to remain on an
organ donor registry in an opt-out system than
to join an organ donor registry in an opt-in system. However, switching to an opt-out system
has been deemed untenable in the United States
since organ donation falls under gift law and so
requires a positive statement of support in favor
of donation (Glazier 2011). In addition, despite
the higher rates of organ donor designation in
the European countries that presume consent,
only Spain has a higher per capita organ recovery rate than the US. While Spain presumes consent, there is an indication that its high recovery
rate is due to a more efficient organization of
transplant services (Deffains and Ythier 2010).
Instead of moving to presumed consent,
therefore, the predominant policy change in
the United States has been to switch the organ
donation registration question from an opt-in
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frame to a “mandated choice” frame (also called
a “forced choice” or an “active choice” frame).
Under an opt-in frame, the individual who is
being asked to register, usually at a state department of motor vehicles, checks a box to register
and leaves it blank not to register. Under a mandated choice frame, the organ donation request
is framed as a “yes” or “no” question whereby
answering yes adds the individual to the registry
and answering no does not. This policy change
has been recently implemented by a number of
US states (e.g., Illinois, California, New York)
as well as by the United Kingdom.
While this switch to mandated choice has been
pushed by organ donor advocates, the support for
the policy comes from hypothetical choice data
in which individuals were more likely to report
being willing to join a registry when asked under
a mandated choice with no prior default than
when asked under an opt-in frame when individuals were presumed to not be donors (Johnson
and Goldstein 2003, 2004). Additional results
have come from the use of mandated choice in
Illinois (Thaler 2009), which was implemented
among other changes including simplifying the
registration process and making organ donor registration legally binding.
In ongoing work, we are investigating whether
the effect of framing the organ donor registration question as a mandated choice increases
registration rates over an opt-in frame where
individuals check a box to register and leave it
blank not to register. Results from an experimental study of actual organ donor decisions
on the Massachusetts Organ and Tissue Donor
Registry suggest that the mandated choice frame
may not deliver an increase in registrations as
promised (Kessler and Roth 2013).
In addition, we find that mandated choice may
have a negative effect on organ donation, even if
it leaves organ donor registration unchanged. As
discussed above, registrations are not the only
way organs can become available for transplant;
the organs of an unregistered deceased can be
donated by surviving next of kin. In a hypothetical choice experiment we ask subjects to report
whether they think next of kin should donate a
deceased’s organs. We show subjects the decision screen the deceased saw (either a mandated
choice frame or an opt in frame) and indicate
the choice made by the deceased (either to join
the registry or not to join the registry). Subjects
are less likely to report that next of kin should
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donate the organs of an unregistered deceased if
the deceased explicitly said no to registration in
a mandated choice framed question than if the
deceased simply chose not to opt in. This suggests that asking individuals to register under a
mandated choice frame may make it harder to
get permission for organ donation from the next
of kin of those who remain unregistered. This
is particularly important because the historical
data in Massachusetts suggests that over half of
the unregistered donors have their organs recovered after next of kin gives permission.
Kessler and Roth (2013) do find that providing a simple and convenient way for donors to
change their organ donation status on the registry increases deceased donor registration, and
so expanding the opportunities to do so under
the current opt-in framework seems worth further exploration. However, note that while we
see great potential in increasing the number of
deceased donor organs available for transplant,
there is a limit to the number of organs that
can be recovered from this source alone. Since
individuals need to die in a manner conducive
to organ donation (e.g., die in a hospital, typically from an intracranial event) for the organs
to be suitable for transplant, there is a bound on
the number of potential donors. Estimates from
2010 suggest that organs are recovered from just
over two thirds of eligible deaths, meaning there
would have been fewer than 3,000 additional
donors if consent for donation were received for
all eligible deaths (Cook and Krawiec 2013).
While these potential donors could save thousands of additional lives, at current rates of
medical need, these donors alone would not be
able to supply all the demand. Consequently, we
must continue working on numerous fronts to
solve this growing problem.
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